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“If someone is able to separate sugar from its sweetness, he will be able to separate 
Islam from politics”. K.H. Abdul Wahab Hasbullah (in Adam Schwarz, A Nation in 
Waiting, 1999, p.162). 
“This is all politics. There is nothing different about PKS. Christian parties, secular 
parties, other Islamic parties all compromise to be successful in politics. We (PKS) 
don’t forget that we are Islamic, we don’t forget our origins. But we also accept that if 
we want to be able to make Indonesia a better place, we need to be able work with 
other. In Islam, cooperation and compromise can be good things”, Anies Matta­
Secretary­General of PKS, (in Greg Fealy et al “Indonesia: Pietism and Compromising 
for Power”, 2008, p. 49). 
 
ABSTRACT 
This article examines the relationship between religion and the state in Indonesia by 
exploring how Islam used by political parties to shape the politics. It has been argued 
that Islam politics is a complementary in both nationhood and statehood in Indonesia. 
From the early days of the new-born nation-state, Muslims in Indonesia had played 
significant role in shaping the nation; nonetheless, they have never dominated the 
political power. Fragmentation among Muslims themselves and internal political 
parties is among the reason why religious (Islamic) parties failed tend to be reluctant in 
bringing religious identity to the state arena. Political subordination-inclusion-
ignorance-confrontation is the circular game that features Islam politics in Indonesia. 
The debatable issue on shari’a law, which is frequently used by Islamic parties, always 
becomes the core problem of the relation between Islam and the state. The idea of 
implementing shari’a law, particularly through constitutional change in the 2009 
election is mainly supported by very view parties in the parliament. It is pretty much 
similar with the 2004 election. However, the non-formal parties, groups outside 
parliaments, such as Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) and Islamic groups still struggle to 
included state’s power to ensure the shari’a law. Importantly, since the implementation 
of decentralization, the debate of shari’a law also shifted from national to local issue. 
Of more than four hundred districts/municipalities and 33 provinces, only very view of 
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them have passed any shari’a-based local regulations. As it has been suggested that 
Islam and Muslims played pivotal role in shaping Indonesian politics; yet, bitterly 
enough to say that the involvement of Islam with Indonesia’s politics remains 
complementary factor. Internal conflict and disunity among Islamic parties and the 
state policy, such as marginalization and distrust, are attributable to losing of the 
parties. It apparently seems that using Islam in the political world by elites repeatedly 
fail to dominate the power.  It is firmly believed that Indonesians seemingly prefer 
national (secular) cohesion by choosing nationalist parties rather than bringing Islam 
into pragmatic politics.  
 
Key Words: Islam, Indonesia, Islamic political parties, syari’ah. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Discussion about Islam Indonesia had been marginalized in the global arena in 
the beginning of twentieth century.  Although Indonesia is the most populous Muslim 
country, it is sometimes perceived plays less significant role in shaping the world’s 
Islam. Looking Islam as a ‘political power’ frequently refers to its role in the centers of 
it, the Middle East. The reason could be; first, Muslims in Indonesia are perceived ‘less 
Islamic’ compared to those in the Middle East; second, Islam as a politics has never 
been a single majority political power in the country. Only at very recently; after some 
tragedies such as Bali tragedy and regional link of Jamaah Islamiyah, and the current 
emergence of very view Islamic parties; then the discussion on Islam Indonesia has 
been concerned. 
As reflected strongly by Wahab Hasbullah above in the early days of a new born 
state, it is difficult to deny that concern of Islam cannot be separated with Indonesian 
politics. Despite the fact that Indonesia is not an Islamic state, yet it is neither a secular 
one. We may call it a religion­based state. Pancasila­five principles557, the foundation of 
constitution has so far been established. “Belief in One God”; the first principle, is 
perceived has been addressing and accommodating religious matters before the state. It 
is believed that Pancasila has a fundamental element in the separation between religion 
and the state. As it has been noted that Pancasila does not acknowledge the word 
“secularism”, or firmly separate religion and politics, or insist that religion has no place 
in the state. Constitutionally, furthermore, the Article no. 29 (1) of the 1945 constitution 
states that “The state shall be based upon the belief in the One and Only God”.  
Although to some extent it limits acknowledgement to six officially recognized 
religions (Buddhism, Catholic, Hinduism, Islam, Protestantism, and recently 
                                                             
557 Founded in 1945: belief in one supreme God, humanitarianism, nationalism expressed in the unity 
of Indonesia, consultative democracy, and social justice. 
  2894 
Confucianism), the Article 29 (2) provides that “The state guarantees all persons the 
freedom of worship, each according to his/her own religion or belief”. A scholar 
stresses that to maintaining a commitment to an egalitarian and pluralistic society, 
Pancasila has to abstain to favoring a particular religion as privileged by the state.558 
In this paper, I argue that Islam politics is a complementary in both nationhood 
and statehood in Indonesia. Since Independence, Muslim play significant role in 
shaping the nation; yet, they have never dominated the political power. It is mainly 
because fragmentation of Muslim leaders and Indonesians, arguably, tend to be 
reluctant in bringing religious identity to the state arena. Greg Fealy points out that the 
internal disagreement and rivalries has become the reason why Islam has not enjoyed 
greater power as an autonomous legitimate power.559 Additionally, political Islam has 
long been marginalized and distrusted by the state, i.e. the Soekarno and the Soeharto 
regimes to run the country. Marginalization of Islam sometimes claimed by Islamic 
parties to coin the voices of Muslim within the state. However, by accommodating 
religious matters; such as Ministry of Religious affairs, addressing Islamic economic 
systems e.g. Bank Syari’a, Islamic Jurisprudence; within the state is intelligently set up 
by the state actors to reduce potential power of political Islam. Thus, the internal 
conflict and distrust of the state become the reason why Islam has never dominated the 
major political power. 
The essay begins looking at short history of Islam followed by the characteristic 
of the religion in Indonesia. Next, I look briefly at the debate on the implementation of 
shari’a law. This matter becomes relevant because the distinction of the state and the 
religion function is mainly about the shari’a law. At this point, I employ the work of 
Andrea Teti and Andrea Mura on ‘Islamism’560. Teti and Mura point out that “Islamism 
is a set of political and social movements aiming to ‘bring Islam back’ into politics and 
society”561. Furthermore, the term ‘Islamism’ or ‘Islamist’ groups might be alien in the 
Muslim world; so, it is important to look at Islam either as purely a religion or a 
politics­ Islam politics. Woodward defines ‘Islamist’ as “those parties which advocate 
implementation of shari’a through either legislation or persuasion” 562 . Not less 
important term is the call for ‘Islamic revivalism’ over the past decades from within 
Muslim world to attribute the having fallen behind with major world’s civilization also 
                                                             
558 A. An-Naim, Islam and the Secular State: Negotiating the Future of Shari’a, Harvard University 
Press, Massachusetts, 2008, p. 262. See also J. Fox, A World Survey of Religion and the State, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2008, p. 202. 
559
 Fealy, Limits of Indonesian Political Islam’ in S. Akbarsadeh and A. Saeed (eds.) Islam and Political 
Legitimacy,  RoutledgeCurzon, London and New York, 2003, p. 158. 
560
 Teti and Mura, ‘Islam and Islamism’ in J. Hayness (ed.) Routledge Handbook of Religion and 
Politics, Routledge, London and New York, 2008. 
561 Teti and Mura, p. 102. 
562 Woodward, ‘Indonesia’s Religious Political Parties: Democratic Consolidation and Security in Post-
New Order Indonesia’, Asian Survey, vol. 4, no. 1, 2008, p. 51. 
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critical to analyze. Thus, understanding both perspectives, Islamism and Islamic 
revivalism, is useful in studying Islam Indonesia. 
In the next session I will discuss the role of political parties, particularly Islamic 
parties, in shaping Indonesian politics. In this regard, I apply the term ‘politicizing 
religion’ or ‘religion politicization’ to refer to the use of religion for political purposes. 
In this regard, the so­called “political Islam” is attributable on how religion politicized. 
A prominent young Indonesia scholar defines political Islam as any “efforts that 
promote Muslim aspirations and carry an Islamic agenda into laws and government 
policy through electoral process and representative (legislative) institution”.563 As in 
case of Indonesia, some religious parties have very often used religious attributes; such 
as, text, organization, to achieve their own longer term agenda or for short term purpose, 
e.g. to gain vote in election. The question is how religious parties use religion matters in 
the politics? And a conclusion should be drawn in the end of this paper.  
 
II. ISLAM IN INDONESIA 
a) Brief History 
How Islam spread and who brought the religion in the archipelago is critical 
questions. Importantly, how the religion becomes majority in a nation which initially 
founded aggregated of different widespread kingdoms in just less than a century.564 To 
answer these questions scholars have different historical point. A Duct scholar, Snouck 
Hurgronje, claimed that Islam brought by middlemen in trade between the Middle east 
and Nusantara565 and the Malay world. While doing business they also propagated Islam 
into communities who had different beliefs such Hinduism, Buddhism, and indigenous 
belief. These middlemen followed by Arabs titled of Syarif or Sayyid566, to complete the 
spreading of Islam either as “priests”, “priest­princes” or Sultans567. They were believed 
mostly the descendants of the Prophet Muhammad. However, Asyumardi Azra 
mentions that in Indonesian historians believed the origin of religion began to 
widespread directly from Arabia in the first century A.H./seventh century C.E. This 
                                                             
563 A. Baswedan, ‘Political Islam in Indonesia: Present and Future Trajectory’, Asian Survey, vol. 44, 
issue 5, 2004, p. 670. 
564 It has been noted that under-25 generation had made up more than two hundred population 
strikingly in part of the great deal of Islamization of Indonesia, R. Wright, “Islam’s New Face Visible in a 
Changing Indonesia”, Online Los Angeles Times, Wednesday, December 27, 2000. 
565
 Nusantara literally means archipelago, a name used by the Western colonial such as Portuguese, 
Duct, and British to refer to archipelagos along Sumatra, Java, Bali, Sulawesi, and Moluccas.   
566
 Syarif and Sayyid still used by Arabs descendents in some parts of Indonesia, e.g. in Ampel in East 
Java and in Mandar in the western Sulawesi Pennisula. 
567 Sultan also exists in Jogyakarta, Central Java, Pekanbaru Sumatra, Ternate in Moluccas and Pasir 
in Kalimantan. These mainly occur in former Islamic kingdoms, where local people keep their cultural 
but not in political term. 
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theory based on the style of gravestones at Pasai, North Sumatra especially one dated 27 
September 1428, which is similar to the grave of Maulana Malik Ibrahim (d. 1419) in 
Gresik, East Java.568 
In the next expansion, Islam became a new belief in the Nusantara. Benedict 
Anderson noted that the religion widespread through trading not conquest. Rather than 
revolutionary, it was assimilative penetration. Anderson illustrates the dissemination: 
… Islam came to the archipelago on the heels not of conquest but of trade. It 
was first brought by traders and has never lost the marks of its provenance, developing 
its strongest hold in the immediate, commercial rather than the upper, official or lower, 
peasant strata. After an initial period of zealotry, the devout Islamic groups were more 
or less absorbed into the patrimonial state.569 
It could be true to accept Anderson’s theory to attribute the penetration in the 
early days especially in Javanese kingdoms such as Mataram and Kediri. Yet, the other 
penetration, in fact, was through war and conquest. Once Islam had been ‘officially’ 
embraced by local kings, the local kingdoms sometimes justified Islam to conquer their 
neighboring ‘states’ such as desperate story of local wars in the eastern region of 
Indonesia. For example, the well­noted history of Sultan Hasanuddin in Gowa, 
propagated Islam trough war in its neighbors by attacking Bone, Butan, and until the 
Moluccas archipelagoes.570 However, this focus of this paper does not focus on the 
history of penetration of Islam Indonesia. 
Along the historical journey as nation­state of Indonesia, Islam also grew 
remarkably. In the Duct and Japanese colonialism, Muslims and their leaders had taken 
leading role in struggling for independence. Many well­known heroes were ulama 
(Muslim scholars) who not only thought and led communities in spiritual or religious 
matters, but also became troop leaders against colonialism. Religious organizations such 
as Muhammadiyah (founded 1912), Persis (1920), and Nahdatul Ulama (1926) were the 
main pockets for fighters against the Duct and Japanese occupation. In short, Muslims 
and Islamic organizations both have a prominent role in founding Indonesia. With the 
emergence of Muhammadiyah, Persis and NU, the interpretation of Islam also differed 
in the so­called “modernist” and “traditionalist” mainstream groups.  
According to Burhanuddin, for modernist groups, such as Muhammadiyah and 
Persis, to comprehend and implement Islam, they follow the salaf method which is to 
prioritize on the Islamic texts (Koran and Hadits). Thoughts of Ibnu Taimiyah used to 
                                                             
568 A. Azra, Islam in the Indonesian World: An Account of Institutional Formation, Mizan, Jakarta, 
2006, p. 11. 
569 B. Anderson, Language of Power, Exploring Political Cultures in Indonesia, Cornell University 
Press, Ithaca and London, 1990, p. 68. 
570 For further notes on the war penetration, see for example, Barbara Andaya, The Heritage of Aru 
Palakka: A History of South Sulawesi in the Seventeenth Century, Nijhoff, The Hague, 1981. 
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intend to be literalists in its theological and ritual aspects used. Another important 
characteristic of this groups tend to be puritan in religious model and rejects cultural 
factors in religious practices. Literalistic and rationalistic are typical of Muhammadiyah 
and Persis. As for traditionalist group mainly referred to NU, firmly maintained 
traditions established by the ulemas in the early period of Islam. The tradition is 
intended to bridge to understand the Islamic texts. Thus, the distinction of modernist 
and traditionalist groups lay in not only their views of religion, but also orientation on 
culture.571 
There were several elements underlying the contrasting political behavior of NU 
and Masyumi. First, both parties tended to see themselves as direct competitors for 
Muslim constituency and both vied for control of the Department of Religious Affairs 
with its lucrative patronage opportunities and capacity to influence grassroots Islamic 
activities. Finally, NU tended to adopt a more pragmatic and accommodatory approach 
to politics than did Masyumi. NU used politics as a means of securing or protecting its 
sectional interests, particularly insofar as access to government patronage and the 
religious bureaucracy were concerned. In pursuing these interests, flexibility, 
moderation and a capacity for compromise became defining feature of NU’s behavior. 
The Masyumi, by contrast, emphasized resoluteness and consistency in their approach 
to politics. They were reluctant to compromise on core matters of policy and frequently 
quoted passages from the Qur’an and hadith enjoining steadfastness and commitment to 
what is deemed right. In practical politics, these differences inclined NU and Masyumi 
towards alliances with non­Islamic parties rather than each other. NU was drawn to the 
Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI), with its populist, Java­centric orientation; Masyumi 
found co­operation with the technocratic Socialist Party (PSI) and outer island­based 
Christian parties more congenial. Only on overtly Islamic issues such as the Jakarta 
Charter did NU and Masyumi co­operate closely.572 
When Indonesia became a new nation­state, Islam remained as the main belief. 
It is not clear how Islam suddenly became the majority of religion in a period less than 
one century. However, the way of Indonesia Muslim interpret and understand the 
religion has been different. The difference is based the cultural background which is so 
diverse in Indonesia. In the so­called aliran (literally means ‘stream’), the American 
anthropologist, Clifford Geerzt classified pluralism within Islam itself into santri, 
abangan, and abangan. Geertz defines aliran as “comprehensive patterns of social 
integration”.573 Doogue and Kirkwood explains this category574: 
                                                             
571 Burhanuddin, ‘Mainstream Islam in Indonesia’ in R. Sukma and C. Joewono (eds.) Islamic Thought 
and Movements in Contemporary Indonesia, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta, 
2007, p. 29-31. 
572 Fealy, Limits, p. 158-9. 
573 Geertz, ‘The Javanese Village”, in G. W. Skinner (ed.) Local, Ethnic, and National Loyalties in 
Village Indonesia, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1957, p. 57. 
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o Santri Muslims, literally means Muslim students, i.e. Muslims, who devout and 
orthodox in their practice of Islam. Originally this term referred to Muslims who were 
educated in pesantren, but it now includes all orthodox believers who may not 
necessarily have a pesantren background; 
o Abangan Muslims, who combine elements of the prior indigenous, animist, Buddhist 
and Hindu beliefs with Islam, and they tend to be more nominal and less practicing as 
Muslims; 
o Priyayi Muslims, who belong to the Javanese aristocracy and combine abangan beliefs 
with Javanese courtly culture. Since the global resurgence of Islam in 1970s and 1980s, 
many abangan and priyayi believers have become santri, and there has been a so­called 
‘santri­fication’ of Islam. 
Arguably, this category might be less relevant in socio­cultural today’s 
Indonesian Muslims, yet; we look at the pattern of political preference of Muslims in 
the last two elections, 2004 and 2009, the Geerzt’s category can be traced. It is 
particularly in within Islamic parties. Even, it is argued that despite the two current 
elections (2004 and 2009) show the win of nationalist­secular parties is tangible; 
traditional Muslim voters remain choose the parties based on this category, e. g. the 
votes for PPP, PKB and PAN are mainly from santri Muslim. I will discuss this in the 
next part of this paper. 
It is important to note that Islam in Indonesia typically pluralistic. Plural Islam 
here means the interpretation of Islam has diverse for many Muslims; i.e., there has 
been no single concept of how the religion deals with the nation­state for example. The 
vast majority are Sunni and Shafii’I school of thought. Mainstream of those Sunni­based 
thought are belonging to Nahdathul Ulama and Muhammadiyah. Also there is a very 
view of; yet, marginal of Shii. Not less important is the fact that the existence of 
indigenous beliefs who incorporate animism and Islam or other major recognized 
religions e.g. Hinduism and Buddhism. Those indigenous groups, who were sometimes 
ignored and enforced to any ‘alien’ religions during the Soeharto regime, now claim 
their rights to exist before the state. 
 
b) Syari’a law 
The debate of the position of religion, Islam precisely, in the state has been 
major subject in the history of Indonesia’s politics and constitution. It is mainly the 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
574 Doogue and Kirkwood, Tomorrow’s Islam: Uniting Age-Old Beliefs and a Modern World, ABC 
Books, Sydney, 2005, p. 274. 
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question on whether the shari’a law is recognized in the constitution.575 It is particularly 
surrounded on the so­called Jakarta Charter (Piagam Jakarta), an agreement on 22 June 
1945 among the founding father such as Soekarno, Muhammad Hatta, AA Maramis, 
Abikusno Tjoksujoso, Abdulkahar Muzakkir, Agus Salim, Ahmad Soebardjo, Wahid 
Hasyim, and Muhammad Yamin. The charter then became the 1945 Constitution had 
been approved. Yet, the un­ending bitter debate until nowadays is the seven­word clause 
“… dengan kewajiban menjalankan syariat Islam bagi pemeluk-pemeluknya” [… with 
the obligation for adherents of Islam to practice Islamic law].576 
Interpretation and definitely implication of the charter was vague, according to 
Greg Fealy. For minimalist group, the obligation to follow shari’a law set individual 
Muslims, not the state. The maximalists insist that to ensure adherents of Islam 
commitment to the shari’a was the state’s function and the constitutional basis for broad 
legislation would be provided through the charter. Fealy, further, notes that even if most 
Muslim leaders advocate the inclusion of the clause within the constitution perceived by 
nationalist and non­Muslims as an effort to create Indonesia an Islamic state, it would 
not have had this effect. Even, the charter was intended “as an adjunct to Pancasila, not 
replacement”; the proposal for Islam to be the official state religion never been 
proposed.577  
In Indonesia, the term “shari’a” is commonly understood differently into two 
meanings. An­Naim illustrates578: 
 Shari’a with a capital “S” is used to refer to the totality of God’s detailed guidance for 
humanity. This vision of Shari’a is believed to be eternal and universal, but it is to be 
derived from the totality of God’s signs (ayat), which are conveyed in the material 
world, as well as in the Qur’an. 
 Shari’a with a small “s”, which is fiqh, is the product of the human law­law making 
process, or ijtihad (juridical reasoning by Islamic scholars according to the traditional 
methodology of Islamic jurisprudence. However, strongly believed to be valid and 
binding, the product of this process is always merely speculative conjecture and 
necessarily temporary and transient. Although fiqh purports to regulate human behavior, 
there is always flexibility and freedom for each human being to choose among a range 
of options without fear of committing an offense or sin that warrants punishment. 
 
                                                             
575 Baswedan, ‘Political Islam in Indonesia, Present and Future Trajectory’, Asian Survey, vol. 44, no. 
5, 2004, p. 669. 
576 For details of  the constitution see  Lili Romli, Islam Yes, Partai Islam Yes, Pustaka Pelajar, 
Yogyakarta, 2006, p. 265-6. 
577 Fealy, Limits of Indonesian Political Islam, p. 155. 
578 An-Naim, p.245. 
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III. POLITICIZING ISLAM: POLITICAL PARTIES 
How religious parties use religion matters in the politics? What are the roles of 
Islamic parties in Indonesia?  
It has been mentioned above; I use the term ‘politicizing religion’ or ‘religion 
politicization’ to refer to the use of religion for political purposes. In this section, I 
attempt to assess how religious matters used to negotiate the power with the state. 
Anderson has suggested that by assessing the major socio­political roles of 
religion in the Southeast Asian nations, we might frequently express surprise that 
“religion has always failed politically”. It is true that nowhere in the region, with partial 
exception of Indonesia, have religious leaders become Prime Ministers or heads of state. 
Indonesia herself is a marginal case, since the Muslim leaders Muhammad Natsir and 
Sukiman each survived as prime ministers for only a few months. However, Anderson 
further stated: 
“…religion has been a very significant political factor, while religious leaders 
and movements have been great political failures­only makes sense if one believes that 
religion is subsumed under politics, and only if one assumes that religious people in 
politics see politics in the way that ‘secular’ people do. What I am suggesting is simply 
that from the religious perspective what looks like major political failure may be quite 
inconsequential, and that ‘failure’ in, say, Jakarta, may not mean failure among millions 
of ordinary Indonesians.”579 
It is true, Anderson’s suggestion then proved again when the prominent Muslim 
leader, Abdurrahman Wahid, had been toppled down and had less than one period 
administration in (1999­2001). Being a long time decidedly secular state, a remarkable 
growing Islamic identity, such as new political parties, Islamic schools, civic groups, 
Islam media, has redefined Indonesia, according Wright. It is believed that 75 percent of 
Indonesian Muslims wished to play important role in society and government policy, 
and about 54 percent of public yearned for religious leaders to get involve vigorously in 
the politics.580 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
579 B. Anderson, ‘Religion and Politics in Indonesia since Independence’ in Benedict R.OG Anderson et 
al,  Religion and Social Ethos in Indonesia, The Australia-Indonesia Association and the Centre of 
Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, Victoria, 1975, p. 22. 
580 Wright, Los Angeles Times, Wednesday, December 27, 2000. 
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a) After Independence until the End of the New Order Period 
Acknowledged by the Soekarno regime as the mainstream of Muslim’s socio­
political representation, NU and Muhammadiyah became stronger. However, as Fealy 
argues that lack of solidarity and conflict between these organizations became a main 
element in the political dynamic from the late 1950s, when Soekarno and the army were 
approaching Indonesia towards the authoritarian Guided Democracy. Masyumi was 
firmly opposed to toppling down of parliamentary democracy, arguing that it was not 
only violate of the community’s democratic rights but also contrary to the Islamic 
principle that supported consultation (musyawarah) and deliberation (mufakat) between 
the government and people. By contrast, NU halfheartedly agreed to Guided 
Democracy, fearing that its own interest as well as those of the broader Muslim 
community would be endangered if it rejected to involve. It is believed that the 
agreement and involvement of NU was important to the approach of Soekarno’s Guided 
Democracy. In the further step, Soekarno exposed his new regime as mixing the 
diversity of Indonesian politics. Then, president Soekarno mad up the acronym 
Nasakom (i.e. Nasinalis-Agama-Komunis or Nationalist­Religion­Communist) to 
portray the supposed combination of these different elements.581 Perhaps, it is the first 
idea to unite between communism and religion in the world; as Soekarno did. 
It is not surprising, as a result of Masyumi disagreement, the Soekarno regime 
banned Masyumi in 1960. In 1962 senior Masyumi leaders were arrested and under 
arrested until 1967. The parliament restricted by reducing Islamic parties into just 25 
percent, down 45 percent in the 1955 democratically elected parliament. The regime 
also decreased NU’s involvement over the direction of government. In this case, Fealy 
suggests that marginalization Islam politics was the consequence of the lack solidarity 
of Islamic groups in the Soekarno regime.582 
In 1966 the New Order emerged. Led by general Soeharto, the regime isolated 
and in­house detained Soekarno. The Soeharto regime, according to Fealy, placed Islam 
as a political force into suspicious and distrusted Muslims leaders. Despite it allowed 
the founding of new Islamic party, Parmusi (the Indonesian Muslim Party) in 1967, 
nevertheless; it did not permit to rehabilitate Masyumi. Similar with Soekarno regime, 
the New Order and particularly Soeharto himself believed that Islam political parties 
were potential power challengers that could undermine the secular based state. 
Accordingly, by domesticating Islamic parties, Muslims elites and proponents of shari’a 
law not only failed to make Islamic state, but also they were marginalized and perceived 
as “minorities” or “outsiders” in the state. They were frequently an object of distrusting 
and suspecting of anti Pancasila. Again, as it has been suggested that in the early the 
                                                             
581 Fealy, Limits, p. 159.  
582 Fealy, Limits, p. 160.  
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New Order regime the political Islam were “constitutionally, physically, electorally, 
bureaucratically, and symbolically defeated.”583 
In addition, in the Soeharto regime, Islam had been “politicized”, according to Hefner. 
Suspecting Islam as potential power contender to national politics, the government 
initiated and enforced all social and political groups, including religious organizations, 
to use Pancasila as their “sole foundation” (asas tunggal). It was believed that by 
pushing socio­political organizations under the Pancasila base policy, Muslims 
considered their organization had finally destructed. Party of Unity and Development, 
the only Islamic parties at the period, for example, bitterly accepted the government’s 
policy. The policy considered similar to the earlier Dutch colonial effort of allowing 
“Islamic religion but ruthlessly repressing all forms of political Islam”. 584 
Furthermore, the relation between the state and Islam had been fluctuated. 
However, as Thaba notes a number of accommodative actions by the New Order regime 
to Muslim, as shown in the table below: 
 
No Cases Year  Initiative State & Muslims response 
1. The demand to 
abolish the ban 
using Jilbab in 
schools 
1980s/
early 
1999s 
Muslims the state accommodated the 
demand and in 1991 the ban 
was abolished 
2. National 
Education 
Constitution 
Draft 
1988 State Created strong reaction 
among Muslims. However, 
Muslims’ opposition reduced 
through lobbying by Muslim 
leaders. The government 
finally accommodated 
Muslims’ demand and all the 
drafts which considered 
against Islamic values were 
rejected. Regulation on 
education that not pro Islamic 
education was rejected. 
3.  Draft of 1988 State Muslims responded 
                                                             
583 B. Effendy, Islam and the State in Indonesia, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2003, 
p. 2. 
584 Hefner, Civil Islam, p. 121-122. Further discussion on this, see Anthony Reid, ‘Nineteenth Century 
Pan-Islam in Indonesia and Malaysia’, The Journal of Asian Studies, vol. 26, no. 2, 1967, pp. 267-283. 
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Religious 
Jurisprudence 
enthusiastically because it 
was believed giving support 
for Muslim interest  
4.  SDSB 
(gambling) 
1990s Muslim Government accept Muslims 
objection and the gambling 
was banned 
5 YABMP 
(Muslim­
Pancasila 
Foundation) 
1980s 
& 
1990s 
State/president Muslims responded positively 
to gain fund­support to build 
mosques around Indonesia 
6. Joint­Degree 
between 
Ministry of 
Home Affairs & 
Religious 
Ministry 
1990s  State Muslims accepted the 
initiative of government to 
arrange the religious charity 
(zakat) 
7. Musmalat Bank 1990s State Muslims positively the 
establishing of the so­called 
Bank Shari’a Muamalat 
8 Muslim 
Scholars 
Association 
(ICMI) 
1990s Muslim, then 
state took the 
initiative 
State supported and Muslims 
broadly advocated 
9 Istiqlal Festival 1990 Muslim 
(particularly 
ICMI 
State supported even 
sponsored. 
Source: Lili Romli, Islam Yes, Partai Islam Yes, 2006, p. 89­91, adapted Abdul Azis 
Thaba, Islam dan Negara dalam Politik Orde Baru [Islam and the state in the Politics of 
the New Order], 1996, p. 313­315. 
Additionally, Effendy classified the New Order regime’s accommodation into 
four kinds: (1) structural; mainly on education, (2) legislative; the National Education 
Law, religious court, and the compilation of Islamic jurisprudence, reversal of policy on 
jilbab, religious alms, annulment of lottery, (3) infrastructural; Muslim Pancasila 
Foundation, “religious project” in Five­Year Development Plan, (4) cultural; adoption 
of Islamic (Arabic?) idiom into Bahasa Indonesia.585 Additionally, in the early years of 
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the New Order, the founding of Majlis Ulama Indonesia (Indonesia’s Council of 
Ulemas­MUI) considered “as a toll to keep politically minded Islamic organizations in 
check”, according Gelling.586 
From socio­political perspective, as Romli has suggested that the founding of 
the Indonesian Muslim Scholars Association (ICMI) was phenomenal accommodation 
of Soeharto regime. Led by Prof Habibie, hundreds of Muslim prominent leaders from 
diverse background were collected to support the New Order interests. Habibie’s unique 
origin was important because he was not from prominent Islamic movements but a 
technocrat and bureaucratic base.587 He himself sometimes called “super minister” due a 
number of essential ministries and departments that he headed; then replaced President 
Soeharto. The pro­cont of the ICMI founding featured Muslims position, particularly 
Islamic organization, in the 1990s of New Order.588  In short, the so­called “Pancasila 
Democracy”, the Soeharto regime effectively isolated political Islam. 
 
b) During Reformasi and transition era 
There have been significant changes in Indonesian politics after the post­
Soeharto regime in 1998. It included the emergence of a many Islamic parties. During 
1998 and 1999, the political parties were mushrooming, including Islamic parties. In 
this era, as reported that there were about 184 political parties, but 148 proposed to 
establish and yet only 141 among them were approved. And there were only 48 parties 
joined the general elections.589 And 21 out of 42 parties were categorized as Islamic; 
typically clearly use Islam as their ideological foundation.590 Woodward classifies the 
parties into four main groups591: 
 Clearly secular parties resisted Arab­like variant of Islam and a more noticeable role of 
Islam in politics. It appealed to Hindus, Christians and other. Indonesian Democratic 
Party­Struggle (PDIP) and the Golkar Party were the categories in this group. 
 Islamic parties led by famous Muslim leaders that focus their segments on Muslim 
community. PKB and PAN could be classified in this group. 
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 Islamic parties that support a significant position within politics and focus on family 
law, Bank shari’a and advocated anti­pornographic and “porno action” law. PKS, PBB, 
and PPP represented this category. 
 A small number of Christian parties. 
Woodward also remarks that in 1999 election the secular parties, PDI­P and the 
Golkar, gained 66.16 in aggregate votes. And the ‘grey’ parties such as PKB and PAN 
also came into top ten major parties.592 It is noteworthy the major political parties were 
reliant heavily on their ‘charismatic’ or symbolic leaders593. For example, Megawati’s 
PDI­P, Abdurrahman Wahid’s PKB, and Amien Rais’ PAN.  
Although religious parties are not dominated by Islam, and there are Catholic 
and Protestant parties as well, the establishment of Islamic parties has opened up a 
public concern. Motives and motivation of the emergence of so many Islamic parties 
had been questioned by many intellectuals and political analysts. Political inference and 
the repercussions for future of Indonesia politics also concerned. Importantly, the 
concern of minority groups, like Catholic and Protestants, who were supported by 
secular groups believed that the rise of so many Islamic parties leaded to anxiety and 
worried that such religion­based parties might increase “political sectarianism”. For 
minority groups, the rise of Islamic parties could eventually lead to national 
disintegration.594 Concern of the minority groups is not new. Azra states, “It is not 
secret that for many years Christians have believed that Muslims generally still support 
the establishment of an Islamic state in Indonesia”595. The increase suspicious of non­
Muslim groups is logical because many political parties replaced their ideological 
foundation from Pancasila to Islam. 
However, as many Indonesia Muslim figures believe that the emergence of 
Islamic parties after the fall of Soeharto regime was simply euphoria of era reformasi, 
which is generally understood by the Muslim elites to mean political freedom and 
democracy. That was not surprising because among the Muslim political leaders, who 
were suppressed and marginalized in the New Order regime. Yet, it was commonly 
believed counterproductive for the unity and welfare of Indonesian Muslim society.596 
In fact, the rise of so many Islamic parties exacerbated the fragmentation of Muslim 
politics. Again Anderson’s thesis on the failure of political Islam in during reformasi era 
proved to be true. It should be kept in mind; however, that they played critical role in 
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stabilizing Indonesia’ peaceful transition to democracy. Even, their participations and 
contention in peaceful way through the elections were constructive.597  
Commenting the failure of Islamic parties in the 1999 election, Effendy stresses 
two aspects should be taken into account. First, the view of that religious bound will 
automatically be followed by political endorsement was repeatedly has not occurred. In 
fact, Islamic parties had no enough acknowledgement of socio­cultural and 
demographic background of Indonesian voters that always change. Religious issues 
could not totally be raised to shape political preference, even if the aliran politics still 
influenced.  Second, the image of Islamic parties, frequently equated with Islamic state 
or the issue of the incorporation of the shari’a law into the state constitution, was critical 
factor as well.598 These factors, I believe, attributable to the unpopularity of Islamic 
parties in the 2004 and 2009 general elections. 
 
c)  After reformasi and beyond: future prospects 
It is important to note that the discourse of Islamic state or shari’a law re­
emerged after the fall of Soeharto regime. Yet, it was not rose by political parties but 
Islamic organizations during this period. As Azra has state that in the 2004 election, 
Islam and Islamic issues “did not become the central and big issues”; rather, most 
Indonesians “were concerned mostly with issues they face in the real life” such as 
economic downturn, widespread corruption, law enforcement, and other social ills like 
drugs and poverty.599 
In addition, An­Naim points out that generally the debate happened among those 
proponents who advocate an active role of the state in ensuring the Jakarta Charter. 
They were including Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (the Indonesian Islamic 
Preaching Council­DDII), Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam (the 
Indonesian Muslims’ World Solidarity­KISDI), Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (the 
Indonesian Mujahidin Council­MMI), Front Pembela Islam (the Islam Defender Front­
FPI), Laskar Jihad, Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), and others. The groups such as 
Nahdathul Ulama, Muhammadiyah, and such Islamic non­governmental organizations 
as Paramadina, Jaringan Islam Liberal (Islam­Liberal Network­JIL), and others firmly 
opposed the idea of formal state’s sponsor of shari’a law.600 
However, by and large, Indonesian Muslims’ commitment to democracy is 
competent. As shown in general elections over the last decade. In 1999 and 2004 
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general elections, voter participation was high: 91 percent and 84 percent respectively, 
and 77 percent for 2004 presidential election. Broad support of Muslim communities for 
democracy is consistently strong. In 2008, 82 percent of Muslim preferred democracy as 
the best political system for Indonesia, according to a poll. 601  This shows that 
Indonesian’s recent political development through democracy has been consolidated.  
Furthermore, during this period, a number of significant developments of 
democratic process are significant. Abdulbaki confirms that constitutional amendments, 
for example, that guarantee of freedom of expression and association and media as well, 
are good efforts. Also significantly, the elimination of the possible re­emergence of a 
new presidential dictatorship has taken place. And political parties are no longer urged 
to adopt Pancasila as the sole foundation by removing the ideological uniformity on the 
political party’s base.602 
The idea of implementing shari’a law, particularly through constitutional change 
in the 2009 election is mainly supported by very view parties in the parliament. It is 
pretty much similar with the 2004 election. However, the non­formal parties, groups 
outside parliaments, such as Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) and Islamic groups still 
struggle to included state’s power to ensure the shari’a law. Equally essential, thanks to 
the implementation of decentralization, the debate of shari’a law also shifted from 
national to local issue. From more than four hundred districts/municipalities and 32 
provinces, only very view of them have passed any shari’a­based local regulations.603 
As Ramage has stated, it was not Islamic parties, but by secular ones, dominating the 
passing of local shari’a regulations. The “shari’a­nization” movement in a small number 
of districts believed undermining Indonesia’s pluralism and diversity. 604  Another 
example of shari’a­base issue is the anti­pornography bill that seems less vocal now in 
the implementation.605 
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In the very recent calculation, Greg Fealy stresses “of the nine general elections 
held since 1955, Islamic parties have never gained more than 44 percent of vote­that is 
less than half of the Muslim vote”. Even in the 2004 and 2009 elections, they obtained 
only about 38 percent of the vote.606 A similar prediction of an Indonesian prominent 
historian is rather convinced that Islamic parties will not rise “as a big political force in 
the elections in 2009” because “re­invigorated Islamic discourse that practically divided 
the ummah into several clusters of religious orientation” affects the political 
development.607 The table below depicts comparison of the top­list party votes in 2004 
and 2009 general elections: 
 
Party 2004 (percent) 2009 
(percent) 
Ideology/Base 
Democrat   7.45% 20.36% Secular­nationalist  
PDIP 18.53 14.32 Secular­nationalist 
Golkar 21.58% 14.24 Secular­nationalist 
PKS  7.34%   8.46% Islam 
PAN  6.44%   6.36% Islam & nationalist 
PPP  8.15%   5.46% Islam 
PKB  8.15%   5.12% Islam & nationalist 
Gerindra  n. a.    4.47% Secular­nationalist 
Hanura  n. a.   3. 52% Secular­nationalist 
PBB  2.62%    1.98% Islam 
Source: Indonesia’s Election Commission (KPU), available at http://www.kpu.go.id and 
adapted by the writer. 
  The result of the 2009 election raises the anxiety about the emergence of Islamic 
parties particularly Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (the Prosperous Justice Party­PKS). 
Approaching the Egyptian Islamist Muslim Brotherhood method, this party has been 
believed as re­emerging of Islamist in Indonesia. Yet, although it slightly increases, it is 
surprising many ones when the party ‘only’ achieved more than 8 percent because 
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before the election held the PKS’s leaders and members strongly believed on their 
calculation that they would gain 20 percent in this vote.608 
 Again, in aggregate, the Islamic parties will not dominate Indonesia’s politics. 
There are three underlying “classical” factors, according Effendy, why they do not gain 
significant votes in the 2009 election: first, “the inability of Islamic parties to translate 
ideological identity into concrete programs”. It is because voters believed that Islam has 
not proved itself as a major in politics. Second, the internal conflict and disunity within 
Islamic parties is also critical reason they fail.  Finally, philosophical shifting “from 
being ideologically driven in the 1940s and 1950s, to pragmatist now” influence the 
failure of Islamic parties.609 
 Finally, any attempt to support the consolidating democracy in Indonesia is 
crucial. Skeptical, even pessimistic, view that Islam is not compatible with democracy 
should be answered by solving problems that could undermine the democratic values. 
Indonesia’s challenges of democracy, as Azra has suggested, associated with four 
factors. First, prerequisites of democracy, such as education and economic development, 
are less developed. Patrimonialism and corruption still rampantly undermine the nation­
state development. Second, some Indonesia Muslims tend to believe the nostalgia to 
unite and merger religion and politics; by translating into formalization of Islam in 
politics. Third, lack of democratic culture among political elites and Muslim 
communities also remains problem. Lastly, the role of civil society organizations is 
fragile too. To support democratic consolidation, the pivotal position of Islamic civil 
society groups has to be advocated.610 
 
CONCLUDING REMARK 
The central argument underlying this paper has been: first, political Islam, 
particularly Islamic (Islamist?) parties, play significant role in the state of Indonesia. 
Second, the role of Islamic parties has never been dominating the national politics. The 
failure of political Islam since independence is attributable with two main factors: 
internal conflict among themselves and the state pressure. As Abootalebi and Abdulbaki 
have suggested that “the relationship between Islam and the state or the role of Islam in 
political life ranges from subordination of the state to Islam… to political 
accommodation… to political inclusion of Islam… to toleration… to ignoring Islam… 
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to direct confrontation” in the political landscape of many Muslim countries has also 
taken place in Indonesia.611 
Being the largest Muslim country, in term of population, Indonesia has 
experienced a relatively short journey of democracy. Since independence in 1945, the 
country ever adopted the so­called “Guided Democracy” urged by the Soekarno regime 
and “Pancasila Democracy” forced by the Soeharto regime. Both regimes had politically 
isolated and distrusted Islam as the potential political contender. When the New Order 
dismantled, political landscape created political euphoria marked by mushrooming 
political parties, particularly Islamic­based ones, that also confusing Muslims.  It is 
understandable then, Indonesian citizen have little experience with real and genuine 
democracy. 
The debatable issue on shari’a law, which is frequently used by Islamic parties, 
always becomes the core problem of the relation between Islam and the state. As it has 
been suggested that Islam and Muslims played pivotal role in shaping Indonesian 
politics; yet, bitterly enough to say that the involvement of Islam with Indonesia’s 
politics remains complementary factor. Internal conflict and disunity among Islamic 
parties and the state policy, such as marginalization and distrust, are attributable to 
losing of the parties. It apparently seems that using Islam in the political world by elites 
repeatedly fail to dominate the power.  In the final remark, I believe that Indonesians 
themselves tend to prefer national (secular) cohesion by choosing nationalist parties 
rather than bringing Islam into pragmatic politics.  
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